Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

@article{Hashimoto2014TwoAA,
  title={Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism},
  author={T. Hashimoto and D. Hirata and Onur Kesten and Morimitsu Kurino and M. {\"U}nver},
  journal={Theoretical Economics},
  year={2014},
  volume={9},
  pages={253-277}
}
  • T. Hashimoto, D. Hirata, +2 authors M. Ünver
  • Published 2014
  • Mathematics, Economics
  • Theoretical Economics
  • This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or… CONTINUE READING
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