Two Unities of Consciousness

  title={Two Unities of Consciousness},
  author={Elizabeth Schechter},
  journal={European Journal of Philosophy},
  • E. Schechter
  • Published 1 June 2013
  • Psychology
  • European Journal of Philosophy
This paper argues for a distinction between possession of a unified consciousness and possession of a single stream of consciousness. Although the distinction has widespread applic- ability in discussions of the structure of consciousness and of pathologies of conscious experience, I will illustrate its importance primarily using the debate about consciousness in split-brain subjects, suggesting that those who have argued that split-brain subjects have two streams of consciousness apiece and… 
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