Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions

@inproceedings{Dobzinski2007TwoRM,
  title={Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions},
  author={Shahar Dobzinski},
  booktitle={APPROX-RANDOM},
  year={2007}
}
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This paper discusses two advancements in the theory of designing truthful randomized mechanisms. [...] Key Result The best previously-known truthful mechanism for this setting guaranteed an approximation ratio of $O(\sqrt m)$. En route, the new mechanism also provides the best approximation ratio for combinatorial auctions with submodularbidders currently achieved by truthful mechanisms.Expand Abstract

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