Two-Level Eudaimonism and Second-Personal Reasons*

@inproceedings{Cokelet2012TwoLevelEA,
  title={Two-Level Eudaimonism and Second-Personal Reasons*},
  author={Bradford Cokelet},
  year={2012}
}
In “Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints,” Mark LeBar claims to have discovered a two-level eudaimonist position that coheres with the claim that moral obligations are “real” and have “nonderivative normative authority.” In this article, I raise worries about how “real” second-personal reasons are on LeBar’s account, and then argue that second-personal reasons ramify up from the first to the second level in a way that LeBar denies. My argument is meant to encourage philosophers in the… CONTINUE READING

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