Turing instabilities in biology, culture, and consciousness? On the enactive origins of symbolic material culture

  title={Turing instabilities in biology, culture, and consciousness? On the enactive origins of symbolic material culture},
  author={Tom Froese and Alexander Woodward and Takashi Ikegami},
  journal={Adaptive Behavior},
  pages={199 - 214}
It has been argued that the worldwide prevalence of certain types of geometric visual patterns found in prehistoric art can be best explained by the common experience of these patterns as geometric hallucinations during altered states of consciousness induced by shamanic ritual practices. And in turn the worldwide prevalence of these types of hallucinations has been explained by appealing to humanity’s shared neurobiological embodiment. Moreover, it has been proposed that neural network… Expand
Comment on: Froese et al.: ‘Turing instabilities in biology, culture, and consciousness’
In their article, Tom Froese and his associates (2013) accept the concept of a ‘biologically embodied mind’ and define their ‘enactive’ approach comprehensively as an attempt to understand the biological, social, and historical origins of the phenomenon of symbolic representation as an aspect of the authors' cultural environment. Expand
Are altered states of consciousness detrimental, neutral or helpful for the origins of symbolic cognition? A response to Hodgson and Lewis-Williams
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Commentary on Turing instabilities and symbolic material culture by Froese, Woodward and Ikegami
It is shown that abnormal subjective states are neither necessary nor essential to understanding the universality of geometric art and can be sufficiently explained by recourse to the normal function of the visual cortex in the context of the regular engagement with everyday materials. Expand
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