Turbulence, Firm Decentralization and Growth in Bad Times

  title={Turbulence, Firm Decentralization and Growth in Bad Times},
  author={Philippe Aghion and Nicholas Bloom and Brian Lucking and Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen},
  journal={Management of Innovation eJournal},
What is the optimal form of firm organization during “bad times”? The greater turbulence following macro shocks may benefit decentralized firms because the value of local information increases (the “localist” view). On the other hand, the need to make tough decisions may favor centralized firms (the “centralist” view). Using two large micro datasets on decentralization in firms in ten OECD countries (WMS) and US establishments (MOPS administrative data), we find that firms that delegated more… 

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