Tuning Cooperative Behavior in Games With Nonlinear Opinion Dynamics

  title={Tuning Cooperative Behavior in Games With Nonlinear Opinion Dynamics},
  author={Shinkyu Park and Anastasia Bizyaeva and Mari Kawakatsu and Alessio Franci and Naomi Ehrich Leonard},
  journal={IEEE Control Systems Letters},
We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available strategy in response to payoffs and other agents’ opinions, as observed over a network. We show how the model provides a principled and systematic means to investigate behavior of agents that select strategies using rationality and reciprocity, key features of… 

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