TulaFale: A Security Tool for Web Services

@article{Bhargavan2003TulaFaleAS,
  title={TulaFale: A Security Tool for Web Services},
  author={Karthikeyan Bhargavan and C{\'e}dric Fournet and Andrew D. Gordon and Riccardo Pucella},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2003},
  volume={abs/cs/0412044}
}
Web services security specifications are typically expressed as a mixture of XML schemas, example messages, and narrative explanations. We propose a new specification language for writing complementary machine-checkable descriptions of SOAP-based security protocols and their properties. Our TulaFale language is based on the pi calculus (for writing collections of SOAP processors running in parallel), plus XML syntax (to express SOAP messaging), logical predicates (to construct and filter SOAP… Expand
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