# Truthfulness for the Sum of Weighted Completion Times

@inproceedings{Angel2016TruthfulnessFT,
title={Truthfulness for the Sum of Weighted Completion Times},
author={Eric Angel and Evripidis Bampis and Fanny Pascual and Nicolas Thibault},
booktitle={COCOON},
year={2016}
}
• Published in COCOON 2 August 2016
• Computer Science
We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms for scheduling selfish tasks on a single machine or on a set of m parallel machines. The objective of every selfish task is the minimization of its completion time while the aim of the mechanism is the minimization of the sum of weighted completion times. For the model without payments, we prove that there is no $$(2-\epsilon )$$-approximate deterministic truthful algorithm and no $$(\frac{3}{2}-\epsilon )$$-approximate randomized…

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