Truthful Cake Sharing

  title={Truthful Cake Sharing},
  author={Xiaohui Bei and Xinhang Lu and Warut Suksompong},
  booktitle={AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
The classic cake cutting problem concerns the fair allocation of a heterogeneous resource among interested agents. In this paper, we study a public goods variant of the problem, where instead of competing with one another for the cake, the agents all share the same subset of the cake which must be chosen subject to a length constraint. We focus on the design of truthful and fair mechanisms in the presence of strategic agents who have piecewise uniform utilities over the cake. On the one hand… 

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