Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Selfish Related Machines

  title={Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Selfish Related Machines},
  author={Nir Andelman and Yossi Azar and Motti Sorani},
  journal={Theory of Computing Systems},
We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents. We provide a 5-approximation deterministic truthful mechanism, the first deterministic truthful result for the problem. Previously, Archer and Tardos showed a 2-approximation randomized mechanism which is truthful in expectation only (a weaker notion of truthfulness). In case the number of machines is constant, we provide a deterministic Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) and a suitable… CONTINUE READING
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