Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models

  title={Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models},
  author={Jens Leth Hougaard and Mich Tvede},
  journal={European Journal of Operational Research},
In this paper we consider the Minimum Cost Spanning Tree model. We assume that a central planner aims at implementing a minimum cost spanning tree not knowing the true link costs. The central planner sets up a game where agents announce link costs, a tree is chosen and costs are allocated according to the rules of the game. We characterize ways of allocating costs such that true announcements constitute Nash equilibria both in case of full and incomplete information. In particular, we find that… CONTINUE READING

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