Truth and meaning

@article{Davidson2004TruthAM,
  title={Truth and meaning},
  author={Donald Davidson},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2004},
  volume={17},
  pages={304-323}
}
It is conceded by most philosophers of language, and recently even by some linguists, that a satisfactory theory of meaning must give an account of how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of words. Unless such an account could be supplied for a particular language, it is argued, there would be no explaining the fact that we can learn the language: no explaining the fact that, on mastering a finite vocabulary and a finitely stated set of rules, we are prepared to produce and to… 

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A 'structural description' of an expression describes the expression as a concatenation of elements drawn from a fixed finite list (for example of words or letters)

  • A 'structural description' of an expression describes the expression as a concatenation of elements drawn from a fixed finite list (for example of words or letters)

6 Assuming, of course, that the extension of these predicates is limited to the sentences of L

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17 There is more than an intimation of this approach to demonstratives and truth in Austin's 1950 article 'Truth', reprinted in Philosophical Papers, Oxford 1961

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Past, Present, and Future, Oxford 1967. 17 There is more than an intimation of this approach to demonstratives and t ruth in Austin's 1950 article 'Truth

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