Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation

  title={Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation},
  author={Andrew H. Kydd},
  journal={International Organization},
  pages={325 - 357}
  • Andrew H. Kydd
  • Published 1 March 2000
  • Economics
  • International Organization
Many scholars have argued that mistrust can prevent cooperation. These arguments often fail to adequately address the possibility that states can take steps to reassure each other, build trust, and thereby avoid conflict. I present a rational choice theory of reassurance focusing on costly signals and identify the conditions under which players can use costly signals to reassure the other side. The central result is that reassurance will be possible between trustworthy players in equilibrium if… 
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