Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal

@article{Simpson2018TrustBA,
  title={Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal},
  author={T. W. Simpson},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  year={2018},
  volume={96},
  pages={447 - 459}
}
  • T. W. Simpson
  • Published 2018
  • Psychology
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Cognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for another's agency may ground one's trusting beliefs, second-personal accounts provide a way to endorse both intuitions. They focus attention on the way that, in normal situations, it is the person whom I… Expand

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