Troubles with Trivialism

@article{Bueno2007TroublesWT,
  title={Troubles with Trivialism},
  author={Ot{\'a}vio A. S. Bueno},
  journal={Inquiry},
  year={2007},
  volume={50},
  pages={655 - 667}
}
  • O. Bueno
  • Published 29 November 2007
  • Psychology
  • Inquiry
According to the trivialist, everything is true. But why would anyone believe that? It turns out that trivialism emerges naturally from a certain inconsistency view of language, and it has significant benefits that need to be acknowledged. But trivialism also encounters some troubles along the way. After discussing them, I sketch a couple of alternatives that can preserve the benefits of trivialism without the corresponding costs. 
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