Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography

@article{Jain2014TrojanhorseAT,
  title={Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography},
  author={Nitin Jain and Elena Anisimova and Imran Khan and Vadim Makarov and Christoph Marquardt and Gerd Leuchs},
  journal={New Journal of Physics},
  year={2014},
  volume={16},
  pages={123030}
}
A quantum key distribution (QKD) system may be probed by an eavesdropper Eve by sending in bright light from the quantum channel and analyzing the back-reflections. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a setup for mounting such a Trojan-horse attack. We show it in operation against the quantum cryptosystem Clavis2 from ID Quantique, as a proof-of-principle. With just a few back-reflected photons, Eve discerns Bobʼs (secret) basis choice, and thus the raw key bit in the Scarani–Acin–Ribordy… Expand

Figures from this paper

Practical Security Bounds against Trojan Horse Attacks in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution
TLDR
This paper analyzed the Trojan horse attacks with different wavelengths and confirmed its side effects, such as crosstalk and anti-Stokes Raman scattering, by a numerical simulation and presented a practical way to estimate the deviation of shot noise and correct the excess noise by inserting different wavelength pulses under joint attacks. Expand
Detection Efficiency Mismatch and Finite-Key-Size Attacks on Practical Quantum Cryptography Systems
TLDR
This thesis presents three experimental studies of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, including a demonstration of Eve’s ability to force a commercial system to distill a key from a raw key of a short length, where the asymptotic assumption of security claimed by the manufacturer might not hold. Expand
Hacking Alice's box in continuous-variable quantum key distribution
Security analyses of quantum cryptographic protocols typically rely on certain conditions; one such condition is that the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) have isolated devices inaccessible to thirdExpand
Quantum Cryptography with Weak Measurements
In this article we present a new prepare and measure quantum key distribution protocol that decouples the necessary quantum channel error estimation from its dependency on sifting, or otherwiseExpand
Risk Analysis of Trojan-Horse Attacks on Practical Quantum Key Distribution Systems
An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horseExpand
Practical security bounds against the Trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution
TLDR
The Trojan-horse attack is turned into an information leakage problem and the system security is quantified and related to the specification of the optical elements most relevant to security. Expand
Invisible Trojan-horse attack
TLDR
It is demonstrated experimentally that the noise response of the detectors to bright pulses is greatly reduced, and by modeling that the same attack will succeed, the invisible nature of the attack poses a threat to the security of practical QKD if proper countermeasures are not adopted. Expand
Quantum key distribution with hacking countermeasures and long term field trial
TLDR
A QKD system designed with this goal in mind is reported, providing a more resilient target against possible hacking attacks including Trojan horse, detector blinding, phase randomisation and photon number splitting attacks. Expand
Quantum man-in-the-middle attack on the calibration process of quantum key distribution
TLDR
This paper reveals the security risk of the calibration process of a passive-basis-choice BB84 QKD system by launching a quantum man-in-the-middle attack which intercepts all calibration signals and resends faked ones, and proposes a basis-dependent detector efficiency mismatch (BEM) based faked states attack on a single photon BB84QKD to stress the threat of BEM. Expand
Quantum Hacking in the Age of Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Cryptography
TLDR
This thesis further investigates the practical security of quantum cryptography in and beyond MDI quantum cryptography, and shows that detector-device-independent (DDI) QKD security is not equivalent to that of MDIQKD and, further, that DDI QKKD is insecure against detector side-channel attacks. Expand
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 76 REFERENCES
Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
We suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations in detector efficiency as a function of a control parameter accessible to an eavesdropper. With gated single-photonExpand
Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems
TLDR
This paper proposes another "time-shift" attack that exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system and proves that if Alice and Bob are unaware of the attack, the final key they share is insecure. Expand
Large pulse attack as a method of conventional optical eavesdropping in quantum cryptography
TLDR
It is concluded that additional protection is necessary for currently implemented quantum key distribution systems against the large pulse attack, a new strategy of eavesdropping on quantum cryptosystems, which eliminates the need of immediate interaction with transmitted quantum states. Expand
Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing
TLDR
A protocol for coin-tossing by exchange of quantum messages is presented, which is secure against traditional kinds of cheating, even by an opponent with unlimited computing power, but ironically can be subverted by use of a still subtler quantum phenomenon, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. Expand
Experimental measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution.
TLDR
Up-conversion single-photon detectors with high efficiency and low noise are developed to faithfully demonstrate the measurement-device-independent quantum-key-distribution protocol, which is immune to all hacking strategies on detection and employed to defend attacks on a nonideal source. Expand
Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems (6 pages)
General Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems, i.e., attacks on Alice or Bob's system via the quantum channel, are analyzed. We illustrate the power of such attacks with today'sExpand
After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at theExpand
Security of two quantum cryptography protocols using the same four qubit states (18 pages)
The first quantum cryptography protocol, proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84), has been widely studied in recent years. This protocol uses four states (more precisely, two complementaryExpand
Wavelength-selected photon-number-splitting attack against plug-and-play quantum key distribution systems with decoy states
Since a single photon source is not available for practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems nowadays, weak coherent state are widely used in practical systems which suffers from theExpand
The security of practical quantum key distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the first quantum information task to reach the level of mature technology, already fit for commercialization. It aims at the creation of a secret key betweenExpand
...
1
2
3
4
5
...