Trivial Tripwires?: Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance

  title={Trivial Tripwires?: Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance},
  author={Brian Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg},
  journal={Security Studies},
  pages={92 - 117}
Abstract How can states most effectively reassure their allies? Existing studies assessing signals of commitment focus on the role of resolve in making assurances credible. This sidelines important questions about the role of capability. We argue that reassurance effectiveness is the product of both capability and resolve, and suggest that high resolve cannot offset low capability. We introduce a new typology of reassurance measures based on the interaction of military capability and resolve… 
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