Transformative experience and the shark problem

@article{Campbell2020TransformativeEA,
  title={Transformative experience and the shark problem},
  author={Tim Campbell and Julia Mosquera},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={2020},
  volume={177},
  pages={3549-3565}
}
In her ground-breaking and highly influential book Transformative Experience , L.A. Paul makes two claims: (1) one cannot evaluate and compare certain experiential outcomes (e.g. being a parent and being a non-parent) unless one can grasp what these outcomes are like; and (2) one can evaluate and compare certain intuitively horrible outcomes (e.g. being eaten alive by sharks) as bad and worse than certain other outcomes even if one cannot grasp what these intuitively horrible outcomes are like… 
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