Transfer Program Complexity and the Take Up of Social Benefits 1

  title={Transfer Program Complexity and the Take Up of Social Benefits 1},
  author={Henrik Jacobsen Kleven},
This paper models complexity in social programs as a byproduct of efforts to screen between deserving and undeserving applicants. While a more rigorous screening technology may have desirable effects on targeting efficiency, the associated complexity introduces transaction costs into the application process and may induce incomplete take up. The paper integrates the study of take up with the study of classification errors of type I and type II, and argues that incomplete take up can be seen as… CONTINUE READING

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