Transaction fee mechanism design

@article{Roughgarden2021TransactionFM,
  title={Transaction fee mechanism design},
  author={Tim Roughgarden},
  journal={ACM SIGecom Exchanges},
  year={2021},
  volume={19},
  pages={52 - 55}
}
  • T. Roughgarden
  • Published 1 June 2021
  • Computer Science
  • ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled changes to the Ethereum blockchain's transaction fee mechanism, including the introduction of variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. These changes are slated for deployment in Ethereum's "London… 

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