• Corpus ID: 227247537

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

  title={Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559},
  author={Tim Roughgarden},
  • T. Roughgarden
  • Published 1 December 2020
  • Computer Science, Economics, Business
  • ArXiv
EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled additions to Ethereum's transaction fee mechanism, including variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. This report assesses the game-theoretic strengths and weaknesses of the proposal and explores some alternative designs. 

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