Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements

@article{Cheung1969TransactionCR,
  title={Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements},
  author={Steven Cheung},
  journal={The Journal of Law and Economics},
  year={1969},
  volume={12},
  pages={23 - 42}
}
  • Steven Cheung
  • Published 1969
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Law and Economics
Publisher Summary This chapter discusses transaction costs, risk aversion, and the choice of contractual arrangements. Every transaction involves a contract, and the transactions conducted in the marketplace entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual contracting parties. The contractual arrangements through which these transfers are negotiated are several and varied. The chapter presents a theory that states that economic efficiency is the same under various land… Expand
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References

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For similar observations see
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A similar investigation conducted in the same localities ten years earlier yielded a virtually identical distribution, id. 37 According to a survey conducted by the Executive Yuan, supra note 26
  • 1935
A Social and Economic Study of Farm Villages in China
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