Trading coups for civil war

  title={Trading coups for civil war},
  author={Jonathan M. Powell},
  journal={African Security Review},
  pages={329 - 338}
This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While ‘coup-proofing’ practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict… Expand
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