Trade Policy Making in a Model of Legislative Bargaining

@article{elik2011TradePM,
  title={Trade Policy Making in a Model of Legislative Bargaining},
  author={Levent Çelik and B. Karabay and J. McLaren},
  journal={ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)},
  year={2011}
}
In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game a la Baron… Expand
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