Trade Generation, Reputation and Sell-Side Analysts

@article{Jackson2003TradeGR,
  title={Trade Generation, Reputation and Sell-Side Analysts},
  author={Andrew B. Jackson},
  journal={Journal of Finance},
  year={2003},
  volume={60},
  pages={673-717}
}
This paper examines the trade‐generation and reputation‐building incentives facing sell‐side analysts. Using a unique data set I demonstrate that optimistic analysts generate more trade for their brokerage firms, as do high reputation analysts. I also find that accurate analysts generate higher reputations. The analyst therefore faces a conflict between telling the truth to build her reputation versus misleading investors via optimistic forecasts to generate short‐term increases in trading… Expand
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