Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing

  title={Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing},
  author={Kristie Dotson},
  pages={236 - 257}
Too often, identifying practices of silencing is a seemingly impossible exercise. Here I claim that attempting to give a conceptual reading of the epistemic violence present when silencing occurs can help distinguish the different ways members of oppressed groups are silenced with respect to testimony. I offer an account of epistemic violence as the failure, owing to pernicious ignorance, of hearers to meet the vulnerabilities of speakers in linguistic exchanges. Ultimately, I illustrate that… 

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