Towards an Information-Neutral Voting Scheme That Does Not Leave Too Much To Chance

  title={Towards an Information-Neutral Voting Scheme That Does Not Leave Too Much To Chance},
  author={Lorrie Faith Cranor and Ron Cytron},
We examine a new voting procedure that allows voters to express their preferences in the form of a voting strategy — a first-order function which specifies a vote. We examine the calculations necessary to formulate such voting strategies, and present examples which illustrate the effects of risk. The voting framework we discuss allows rational voters to vote strategically using decision-theoretic techniques to select their optimal strategies, even if they have no prior information about the… CONTINUE READING

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