Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers

@article{Kulkarni2022TowardsAT,
  title={Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers},
  author={Kshitij Kulkarni and Theo Diamandis and T. Chitra},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2022},
  volume={abs/2207.11835}
}
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents excess value captured by miners (or validators) from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering users transactions to maximize fees or inserting new transactions that allow a miner to front-run users’ transactions. The most common type of MEV involves what is known as a sandwich attack against a user trading on a popular class of automated market makers known as CFMMs. In this first paper of a series on MEV, we… 
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