Towards Network Games with Social Preferences

  title={Towards Network Games with Social Preferences},
  author={Petr Kuznetsov and Stefan Schmid},
Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system equilibria: the system states in which no player can increase her utility by unilaterally changing her behavior. However, assuming that all players are selfish and in particular that all players have the same utility function may not always be appropriate. Hence… Expand
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