• Corpus ID: 212747979

Towards Data Auctions with Externalities

  title={Towards Data Auctions with Externalities},
  author={Anish Agarwal and Munther A. Dahleh and Thibaut Horel and Maryann Rui},
The design of data markets has gained in importance as firms increasingly use predictions from machine learning models to make their operations more effective, yet need to externally acquire the necessary training data to fit such models. A property of such markets that has been given limited consideration thus far is the externality faced by a firm when data is allocated to other, competing firms. Addressing this is likely necessary for progress towards the practical implementation of such… 

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