Toward a Theory of Civil–Military Punishment

  title={Toward a Theory of Civil–Military Punishment},
  author={Daniel Bessner and Eric Lorber},
  journal={Armed Forces \& Society},
  pages={649 - 668}
This article addresses a significant question in American civil–military relations: under what conditions will civilian principals punish military leaders for shirking? In order to inductively derive a theory of civil–military punishment, the authors examine two cases of military shirking where there is little doubt that insubordination occurred. The first case the authors analyze is Douglas MacArthur’s insubordination under Harry Truman during the Korean War, and the second is Colin Powell’s… 
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