• Corpus ID: 14431740

Topologies and Price of Stability of Complex Strategic Networks with Localized Payoffs : Analytical and Simulation Studies

  title={Topologies and Price of Stability of Complex Strategic Networks with Localized Payoffs : Analytical and Simulation Studies},
  author={Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam and C. A. Subramanian and Ramasuri Narayanam and Y. Narahari and Srinath Narasimha},
We analyze a network formation game in a strategic setting where payoffs of individuals depend only on their immediate neighbourhood. We call these payoffs as localized payoffs. In this game, the payoff of each individual captures (1) the gain from immediate neighbors, (2) the bridging benefits, and (3) the cost to form links. This implies that the payoff of each individual can be computed using only its single-hop neighbourhood information. Based on this simple model of network formation, our… 
1 Citations

Figures and Tables from this paper

Analysis and mining of online social networks: emerging trends and challenges
Some of the current challenges in the analysis of large‐scale social network data include social network modeling and representation, link mining, sentiment analysis, semantic SNA, information diffusion, viral marketing, and influential node mining.


The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
A careful empirical analysis demonstrates that the average price of anarchy is better in the bilateral connection game than in the unilateral game for small link costs but worse as links become more expensive.
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
We study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks, when self-interested individuals have the discretion to form or sever links. First, in the context of two stylized models, we
Strongly stable networks
It is shown that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and this work uses that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist stronglystable networks via a ``top convexity'' condition on the value function on networks.
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation
It is established that the fair cost allocation protocol is in fact a useful mechanism for inducing strategic behavior to form near-optimal equilibria, and its results are extended to cases in which users are seeking to balance network design costs with latencies in the constructed network.
A Clustering Coefficient Network Formation Game
A new network formation game in which rational players must balance edge purchases with a desire to maximize their own clustering coefficient is introduced, and several of the results hold even for weaker notions of equilibrium, such as those based on link stability.
The Hitchhiker's Guide to Affiliation Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach
A new class of game-theoretic models for network formation is proposed in which strategies are not directly related to edge choices, but instead correspond more generally to the exertion of social effort, which can more naturally explain the emergence of complex social structures.
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
This paper proves that there is a Nash equilibrium as cheap as the optimal network, and gives a polynomial time algorithm to find a (1+ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium that does not cost much more.
The formation of networks with transfers among players
We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network, when players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming