Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match

@article{Echenique2020TopOT,
  title={Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match},
  author={Federico Echenique and Ruy Gonzalez and Alistair J. Wilson and Leeat Yariv},
  journal={ERN: Market Structure (Topic)},
  year={2020}
}
Most doctors in the NRMP are matched to one of their most-preferred internship programs. Since various surveys indicate similarities across doctors' preferences, this suggests a puzzle. How can nearly everyone get a position in a highly-desirable program when positions in each program are scarce? We provide one possible explanation for this puzzle. We show that the patterns observed in the NRMP data may be an artifact of the interview process that precedes the match. Our analysis highlights the… Expand
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