# To Signal or Not To Signal: Exploiting Uncertain Real-Time Information in Signaling Games for Security and Sustainability

@inproceedings{Bondi2020ToSO,
title={To Signal or Not To Signal: Exploiting Uncertain Real-Time Information in Signaling Games for Security and Sustainability},
author={Elizabeth Bondi and Hoon Oh and Haifeng Xu and Fei Fang and Bistra N. Dilkina and Milind Tambe},
booktitle={AAAI},
year={2020}
}
Motivated by real-world deployment of drones for conservation, this paper advances the state-of-the-art in security games with signaling. The well-known defender-attacker security games framework can help in planning for such strategic deployments of sensors and human patrollers, and warning signals to ward off adversaries. However, we show that defenders can suffer significant losses when ignoring real-world uncertainties despite carefully planned security game strategies with signaling. In… Expand
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