To Save Or Not To Save: The Fisher Game

@inproceedings{Mehta2014ToSO,
  title={To Save Or Not To Save: The Fisher Game},
  author={Ruta Mehta and Nithum Thain and L{\'a}szl{\'o} A. V{\'e}gh and Adrian Vetta},
  booktitle={WINE},
  year={2014}
}
We examine the Fisher market model when buyers, as well as sellers, have an intrinsic value for money. We show that when the buyers have oligopsonistic power they are highly incentivized to act strategically with their monetary reports, as their potential gains are unbounded. This is in contrast to the bounded gains that have been shown when agents strategically report utilities [5]. Our main focus is upon the consequences for social welfare when the buyers act strategically. To this end, we… 

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