To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

  title={To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships},
  author={Edward Goldring and Austin S. Matthews},
  journal={British Journal of Political Science},
Why do dictators purge specific elites but not others? And why do dictators purge these elites in certain ways? Examining these related questions helps us understand not only how dictators retain sufficient competence in their regimes to alleviate popular and foreign threats, but also how dictators nullify elite threats. Dictators are more likely to purge first-generation elites, who are more powerful because they can negotiate their role from a position of strength and possess valuable… 

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