Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations

@article{Nowak1992TitFT,
  title={Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations},
  author={Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund},
  journal={Nature},
  year={1992},
  volume={355},
  pages={250-253}
}
THE 'iterated prisoner's dilemma' is now the orthodox paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals. This viewpoint is strongly supported by Axelrod's computer tournaments, where 'tit for tat' (TFT) finished first1. This has stimulated interest in the role of reciprocity in biological societies1–8. Most theoretical investigations, however, assumed homogeneous populations (the setting for evolutionary stable strategies9,10) and programs immune to errors. Here we try to come… 
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TLDR
The aim is studying in a mathematically rigorous fashion the dynamics of a simplified version for the computer experiment in Nowak and Sigmund involving 100 reactive strategies, and sees that as the generosity degree of the G individuals varies, equilibria of the dynamics appear or disappear, and the dynamics changes accordingly.
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