• Corpus ID: 246015855

Tit for Tat: Cooperation, communication, and how each could stabilize the other

@inproceedings{Odouard2022TitFT,
  title={Tit for Tat: Cooperation, communication, and how each could stabilize the other},
  author={Victor Vikram Odouard and Michael Holton Price},
  year={2022}
}
Explanations for altruism, such as kin selection, reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, punishment, and genetic and cultural group selection, typically involve mechanisms that make altruists more likely to benefit from the altruism of others . In the case of kin altruism and reciprocity, individuals use private information to identify targets of their altruism. In the case of indirect reciprocity, where individuals cooperate with high-reputation individuals, outside information is required: unless… 
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