Tipping and Residential Segregation: A Unified Schelling Model

@article{Zhang2009TippingAR,
  title={Tipping and Residential Segregation: A Unified Schelling Model},
  author={Junfu Zhang},
  journal={ERN: Quality of Life \& Environmental Comparisons (Topic)},
  year={2009}
}
  • Junfu Zhang
  • Published 7 February 2011
  • Economics
  • ERN: Quality of Life & Environmental Comparisons (Topic)
This paper presents a Schelling-type checkerboard model of residential segregation formulated as a spatial game. It shows that although every agent prefers to live in a mixed-race neighborhood, complete segregation is observed almost all of the time. A concept of tipping is rigorously defined, which is crucial for understanding the dynamics of segregation. Complete segregation emerges and persists in the checkerboard model precisely because tipping is less likely to occur to such residential… 
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