Timed Commitments

  title={Timed Commitments},
  author={Dan Boneh and Moni Naor},
  booktitle={Annual International Cryptology Conference},
  • D. BonehM. Naor
  • Published in
    Annual International…
    20 August 2000
  • Computer Science
We introduce and construct timed commitment schemes, an extension to the standard notion of commitments in which a potential forced opening phase permits the receiver to recover (with effort) the committed value without the help of the committer. An important application of our timed-commitment scheme is contract signing: two mutually suspicious parties wish to exchange signatures on a contract. We show a two-party protocol that allows them to exchange RSA or Rabin signatures. The protocol is… 

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