Timeability of Extensive-Form Games

@inproceedings{Jakobsen2016TimeabilityOE,
  title={Timeability of Extensive-Form Games},
  author={Sune K. Jakobsen and T. Lund and Vincent Conitzer},
  booktitle={ITCS '16},
  year={2016}
}
  • Sune K. Jakobsen, T. Lund, Vincent Conitzer
  • Published in ITCS '16 2016
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • Extensive-form games constitute the standard representation scheme for games with a temporal component. But do all extensive-form games correspond to protocols that we can implement in the real world? We often rule out games with imperfect recall, which prescribe that an agent forget something that she knew before. In this paper, we show that even some games with perfect recall can be problematic to implement. Specifically, we show that if the agents have a sense of time passing (say, access to… CONTINUE READING

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