Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.

@article{Libet1983TimeOC,
  title={Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.},
  author={Benjamin Libet and Curtis A. Gleason and ELWOOD W. Wright and Dennis K. Pearl},
  journal={Brain : a journal of neurology},
  year={1983},
  volume={106 (Pt 3)},
  pages={
          623-42
        }
}
The recordable cerebral activity (readiness-potential, RP) that precedes a freely voluntary, fully endogenous motor act was directly compared with the reportable time (W) for appearance of the subjective experience of 'wanting' or intending to act. The onset of cerebral activity clearly preceded by at least several hundred milliseconds the reported time of conscious intention to act. This relationship held even for those series (with 'type II' RPs) in which subjects reported that all of the 40… 
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
TLDR
It was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears, and it was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously.
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
TLDR
It was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears, and it was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously.
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
TLDR
It was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears, and it was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously.
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
TLDR
It was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears, and it was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously.
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
TLDR
It was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears, and it was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously.
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
TLDR
It was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears, and it was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously.
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
TLDR
It was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears, and it was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously.
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
TLDR
It was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears, and it was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously.
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
TLDR
It was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears, and it was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously.
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
TLDR
It was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears, and it was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously.
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