Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller’s revenue in Dutch auctions

@article{Katok2008TimeIM,
  title={Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller’s revenue in Dutch auctions},
  author={Elena Katok and A. Kwasnica},
  journal={Experimental Economics},
  year={2008},
  volume={11},
  pages={344-357}
}
  • Elena Katok, A. Kwasnica
  • Published 2008
  • Business
  • Experimental Economics
  • Abstract We study the role of timing in auctions under the premise that time is a valuable resource. When one object is for sale, Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions are strategically equivalent in standard models, and therefore, they should yield the same revenue for the auctioneer. We study Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions in the laboratory, with a specific emphasis on the speed of the clock in the Dutch auction. At fast clock speeds, revenue in the Dutch auction is… CONTINUE READING
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