Time for a Paradigm Shift in Our Disciplinary Culture?

@inproceedings{Koblitz2016TimeFA,
  title={Time for a Paradigm Shift in Our Disciplinary Culture?},
  author={Neal Koblitz},
  booktitle={Mycrypt},
  year={2016}
}
  • N. Koblitz
  • Published in Mycrypt 1 December 2016
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
The well-known KISS principle of engineering — Keep It Simple, Stupid! — is also of value in cryptography. In certain subfields, such as lattice-based crypto and indistinguishability obfuscation, the proposed constructions pay little heed to the KISS principle. Even the descriptions of the proper functioning of the protocols are frightfully complicated (by comparison with RSA or ECC, for example), and the security analyses and guidelines for parameter selection are even more problematic. 

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