Time-Inconsistency and Welfare

  title={Time-Inconsistency and Welfare},
  author={Jay Bhattacharya and Darius N. Lakdawalla},
  journal={Health Economics eJournal},
Self-control devices, such as rehabilitation programs, group commitment, and informal fines, can make time-inconsistent smokers better off. Health economists have used this result to argue in favor of cigarette taxes that restrain smoking. However, taxes alone are not Pareto-improving overall, because they benefit today's smoker at the expense of her future selves, who have less demand for self-control. We suggest an alternative class of taxation policies that provide selfcontrol and benefit a… 
Sin Licenses Revisited
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The Social Discount Rate.
  • Working Paper 7983
  • 2000
Hyperbolic discounting and consumption
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