Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time ∗

@inproceedings{Bigoni2013TimeHA,
  title={Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time ∗},
  author={Maria Bigoni and Andrzej Skrzypacz and Giancarlo Spagnolo},
  year={2013}
}
We study interactions with different durations and termination rules in a (quasi) continuous-time prisoner’s dilemma experiment. We find that cooperation is easier to achieve and sustain with deterministic horizons than with stochastic ones; end-game effects emerge, but subjects postpone them with experience; longer duration helps cooperation. Static theories for continuous-time games cannot simultaneously account for these findings and miss the evolution of behavior across supergames. We… CONTINUE READING
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