# Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms

@inproceedings{Jin2019TightRG,
title={Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms},
author={Yaonan Jin and P. Lu and Z. Tang and Tao Xiao},
booktitle={SODA},
year={2019}
}
• Yaonan Jin, +1 author Tao Xiao
• Published in SODA 2019
• Computer Science, Physics, Mathematics, Economics
We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not necessarily identical) distributions. There are four widely-used and widely-studied mechanisms in the literature: {\sf Myerson Auction}~({\sf OPT}), {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}~({\sf SPM}), {\sf Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve}~({\sf AR}), and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}~({\sf AP}). {\sf OPT} is revenue-optimal… Expand

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