Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment

@article{Fabre2021TiebreakingTH,
  title={Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment},
  author={A. Fabre},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2021},
  volume={56},
  pages={101-124}
}
  • A. Fabre
  • Published 2021
  • Computer Science, Economics
  • Social Choice and Welfare
The paper deals with voting rules that require voters to rate the candidates on a finite evaluation scale and then elect a candidate whose median grade is maximum. These rules differ by the way they choose among candidates with the same median grade. Call proponents (resp. opponents) of a candidate the voters who rate this candidate strictly above (resp. strictly below) her median grade. A simple rule, called the typical judgment, orders tied candidates by the difference between their share of… Expand

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