Threshold Models of Collective Behavior

@article{Granovetter1978ThresholdMO,
  title={Threshold Models of Collective Behavior},
  author={Mark S. Granovetter},
  journal={American Journal of Sociology},
  year={1978},
  volume={83},
  pages={1420 - 1443}
}
Models of collective behavior are developed for situations where actors have two alternatives and the costs and/or benefits of each depend on how many other actors choose which alternative. The key concept is that of "threshold": the number or proportion of others who must make one decision before a given actor does so; this is the point where net benefits begin to exceed net costs for that particular actor. Beginning with a frequency distribution of thresholds, the models allow calculation of… 
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